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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

JAMES CUMMINGS,
(
Defendant-Appellant. '

Case No.
12487

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant, James
Cummings, from a conviction for robbery.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) at a jury trial in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Gordon R.
Hall, presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison as provided
by law for the crime of robbery.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
district court should be affirmed and that the appellant
should be retained in custody at the Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's
brief is accurate and a further statement will not be made
by the respondent except as necessary in presenting its
argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A CLAIMED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF A
LINEUP DEPENDS UPON THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION.
WHERE THE EYEWITNESS HAD AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR MAKING THE
IDENTIFICATION, THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW EVEN THOUGH HE WAS
THE ONLY SUSPECT IN THE LINEUP
WITH SCARS ON HIS ARMS.
The appellant contends that the lineup at which he
was identified was basically unfair and implanted in the
mind of the state's witness that the defendant was the
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same person as the suspect who robbed the Bonus Station
at Ninth South and West Temple in Salt Lake City. To
support his contention that the lineup procedures were
inherently suggestive, the appellant cites the testimony
of his attorney, Jay Edmonds, relating to the composition
of the lineup. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Edmonds was permitted to examine the lineup before the
witnesses were admitted to the show-up room. He was
given the opportunity to raise objections as to the composition or any part of the lineup, but he declined to do
so (T. 20-21).
From the testimony of the identifying witness, Bryce
Nelson, it is clear that Nelson's identification of the defendant was confident and unequivocal and did not depend upon the allegedly suggestive identification procedure. At page 7 of his brief, the appellant takes certain
liberties with his interpretation of the transcript and
would mislead the court by extracting language from the
transcript and labeling it as Nelson's inability to recognize the defendant as the suspect. In actuality, the question to which the witness responded had reference to the
individual who had occupied space number one in the
lineup and not the defendant who had occupied space
number three. vVhen asked if he recognized [Number
One], Nelson responded, "I can't remember" (T. 10).
Nelson testified that the identification was made on the
basis of the general appearance of the suspect (T. 7)
which was a product of the witness' observation of the
suspect at the time of the robbery.
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The standard for determining the illegality of an
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is
set forth in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967),
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967). In these
cases the United States Supreme Court observed that a
pretrial confrontation will constitute a ground for reversal
of the conviction where, depending upon the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the confrontation, it " ...
was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that defendant was denied
due process of law." Stovall, supra, at 302.
The language in both Wade and Stovall indicates
that, in considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding any pretrial identification, the presence of certain other facts in the totality may serve either to justify
an improperly conducted identification or to avoid the
presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by
the allegedly suggestive confrontation. For example, where
factors external to the confrontation itself tend to prove
that the witness's identification was accurate and hence
not prejudicial to the defendant, courts have upheld the
use of identification procedures which arguably could be
regarded as suggestive. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969); Cline
v. United States, 395 F. 2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); Hanks
v. United States, 388 F. 2d 171 (10th Cir. 1968).
In the Rutherford case, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals evaluated the accuracy of an identification resulting from an allegedly suggestive pretrial confronta-
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tion. The witness whose cleaning establishment had been
robbed was called to the police station to examine a suspect. At the station house the witness viewed the defendant, a Negro, in a room with several white detectives by
means of a one-way minor, and immediately identified
him as the criminal. Holding that the identification of the
defendant was probably accurate, regardless of the prejudicial nature of the confrontation, Judge Medina placed
great emphasis on the fact that the witness had for some
five minutes watched the two men who had committed
the robbery, making a deliberate attempt to study the
face of the man who rifled her pocketbook.
This approach to the totality test adopted by the
Second Circuit has support in two Supreme Court decisions since Stouall. In Simnwns v. United States, 390
U. S. 377 (1968), the Court validated a photographic
showup relying, at least in part, upon its belief that there
was little chance that a misidentification had taken place
because the witness had an excellent opportunity to observe the suspects during the robbery. In Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S'. 404 (1968), the Court, splitting four-tofour, affirmed per curiam a conviction resting upon a
showup identification. Significantly, Justice Douglas in
his dissent considered factors similar to those weighed by
the courts in both Rutherford and Simnwns, although he
reasoned that, on the facts of the case, the accuracy of
the identification was in doubt and, therefore, the confrontation violated due process.
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In Thurman v. State, 262 N. E. 2d 635 (Ind. 1970),
the Indiana Supreme Court observed that the resolution
cf \1·hether identification procedures are unduly suggestive
or conducive to irreparable mistaken identity is best accomplished by a hearing in the trial court, for it is there
that an exploration of the circumstances surrounding the
confrontation can be accomplished. On this basis, the
court upheld the identification and conviction of a Negro
defendant who had been the only individual in an all
Negro lineup with an "Afro" haircut where it was shown
that the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the
defendant during the commission of the crime. Parenthetically it should be noted that each of the witnesses
had earlier told police investigators that the suspect wore
his hair in the "Afro" style.
The facts of the insb::it case demonstrate that a careful examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification yields the conclusion that Mr.
N dson identified the defendant without depending upon
the allegedly wggestive circumstances surrounding the
identification procedure. This is not a case where the
witness's identification of the suspect is based upon a fleeting glance of the suspect as in People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.
2d 183, 436 P. 2d 336 (1968). On the contrary, Nelson
was the victim of the crime. He was held at gunpoint by
the suspect in an area of excellent lighting, and as the
witnesses in Rutherford, Simmons, Biggers, and Thurman,
Nelson had an ample opportunity to observe the defend."nt during the commission of the crime.
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The respondent does not seriously contest the appellant's contention that situations may arise in which a
suspect is the only individual in a police lineup with distinguishing features or characteristics. Nor does the respondent argue that such features or characteristics may
have some suggestive impact upon the witnesses who are
present for purposes of identification. For example, in
State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P. 2d 372 (1969), this
Court decried the manipulation of police lineups so as to
be unduly suggestive of identification. However, implicit
in this statement is the Utah Supreme Court's recognition
that the element of suggestability cannot be removed
co:npletely from lineup procedures. Indeed, the Court
observed that the lineup procedure should not be "so
laden with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions
as to make lineups impractical as a method of identifying
the guilty." 22 Utah 2d at 221.
Where the eyewitness has an independent basis for
the in-court identification of the defendant, the United
States Supreme Court has enunciated the rule that such
identification is admissible even though the pre-trial
identification was violative of due process. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). With this in mind,
the Court vacated the conviction of the petitioner in
Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 272-273 (1967) to
permit the California Supreme Court to determine
whether an independent basis would support the identification. See also, Clemons v. United States, 408 F. 2d
1230, 1237 (D. C. Cir. 1968).
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Two recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court
further support the respondent's position that even granting that the lineup procedures suggested which individual
the witness would identify, the identification is not tainted
where there exists an independent basis for the in-court
identification. In State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451
P. 2d 786 (1969), the in-court identification of the defendant was permitted where the witness had an independent basis for making the identification even though the
defendant had been denied counsel at the lineup. Similarly, this Court rejected the appellant's argument in
State v. Jordan, 26 Utah 2d 240, 487 P. 2d 1281 (1971),
holding that any irregularities in the positive identification of the defendant by eyewitnesses could not have
resulted in any substantial prejudice to the defendant and
did not deny him due process where the eyewitnesses had
other bases for making the identification.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the lineup
was representative and conducted in a manner which
would not unduly suggest the identity of the suspect.
The respondent further submits that even granting that
the identification procedure was suggestive, the resulting
identification was not tainted since the identifying witness had an independent basis upon which to form his
in-court identification and that such identification was a
genuine product of the knowledge and recollection of the
witness.
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The respondent therefore prays this Honorable Court
to affirm the conviction of the defendant for the crime of
robbery.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

